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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. The problem discussed by and purpose of this thesis 
Armed conflicts result in too many atrocities being committed. Once a conflict is over, the 
criminal justice system of the affected country should ideally hold accountable those 
responsible for core international crimes. Often, the number of crimes is so high that the 
criminal justice system simply cannot address all of them through regular criminal 
procedure. Ensuring a timely response is even more difficult. The obligation to prosecute 
and punish those responsible for atrocious crimes is enshrined in international law1 and 
national codes of criminal procedure, alongside the concurrent human rights obligation to 
afford a fair trial2 to each defendant. In some countries, particularly those in transition from 
conflicts,3 the criminal justice system lacks the capacity to deal with all the cases, quite 
apart from the question of political will. This results in a backlog of such cases within the 
system. 
The introduction of abbreviated criminal procedures for core international crimes is 
a new idea first introduced in a paper on the backlog of core international crimes cases in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.4 The purpose of this thesis is to examine this topic and to arrive 
at a set of components and principles under which potential abbreviated criminal 
procedures for cases of core international crimes may be developed. It will also raise 
arguments for and against introduction of this mechanism in national law.5 The purpose of 
this mechanism would be to assist states to fulfil their primary obligation to prosecute such 
core international crimes without compromising principles of due process. 
 
1.2. Outline of the thesis 
In order to fulfil the above-stated purpose, this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 
provides a brief overview of main developments that created the need to address the 
                                                 
1
  Articles 49, 50,129 and 146 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions respectively; Article IV of the 1948 
Genocide Convention and most recently the sixth preambular paragraph of the 1998 ICC Statute. See also 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Edited by Otto Triffterer. Second 
edition. Munich, (C.H.Beck-Hart-Nomos) 2008, p. 11. 
2
  ICCPR Article 14; ACHR Articles 8, 9 and 10; ECHR Article 6 and ACHPR Article 7. See also Articles 
55, 63, 66 and 67 of the ICC Statute. 
3
  For example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia and Rwanda. 
4
  See Bergsmo, Morten ... [et al.]. Some remarks on the handling of the backlog of core international 
crimes cases in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sarajevo, 2008, 90 pp. (on file with the author). 
5
  The approach is based on the assumption that core international crimes that are being processed at the 
international level will normally be of such gravity that the abbreaviated criminal procedures would not 
be suitable for them. 
 2 
backlog of core international crimes cases at the national level. Presentation of the 
consequences of backlogs on different processes and expectations within the justice sector, 
victims’ communities and political establishment will follow. 
Chapter 3 identifies relevant legal procedures and practices to help shed light on the 
requisite qualities of abbreviated procedures for core international crimes. It starts with 
consideration of judicial mechanisms developed to expedite international criminal 
procedures. Processes that cannot properly be referred to as abbreviated criminal 
procedures, but nevertheless seek to expedite the administrative response to mass-atrocities 
are also discussed. These processes often exist because full criminal trials for all core 
international crimes are beyond the capacity of many legal systems. They include 
traditional plea negotiations, truth and reconciliation commissions and the gacaca system 
of courts in Rwanda. Chapter 3 continues by discussing some national legislative models 
of abbreviated procedures for ordinary criminal offences. These offences, of course, differ 
significantly from core international crimes, but the procedures used are potentially similar 
to what may be used in an abbreviated system for processing core international crimes. The 
chapter includes a look at the Colombian procedure for dealing with core international 
crimes committed in its internal armed conflict.  
The final section of Chapter 3 spells out some basic features that a potential 
abbreviated criminal procedure for core international crimes should embody. These 
procedures should: 1) be prescribed by law and an integral part of the criminal justice 
system, administered by regular courts without creating extra-judicial mechanisms and 
additional institutional layers; 2) increase the ability to resolve the large numbers of cases 
that create backlogs; 3) apply on a voluntary basis and respect basic fair trial principles that 
cannot be compromised; 4) be transparent and open; 5) be designed as part of the wider 
transitional justice process which is sensitive to victims’ interests and 6) provide for the 
variety of sanctions with the necessary degree of flexibility. 
Chapter 4 sets forth numerous arguments for and against introduction of 
abbreviated criminal procedures for core international crimes, and ends with a list of 
guidelines for such procedures, based on these arguments. 
Chapter 5 will summarise the content of this thesis and offer some concluding 
remarks. 
 
1.3. Methodological observations 
 3 
The present topic is novel and unregulated by law.6 Literature is scarce regarding 
abbreviated criminal procedures for core international crimes. Sociology of law does not 
yet address it. As a result, the methodological approach of this paper will consist of 
comparative analysis that examines expedited judicial mechanisms in international 
criminal procedure, certain processes outside the scope of abbreviated criminal procedures 
as defined herein, domestic legislation for ordinary crimes, and a country specific approach 
to core international crimes committed in an internal armed conflict. Deduction from these 
different approaches will allow for a presentation of what abbreviated criminal procedures 
for core international crimes may entail. It is therefore a de lege ferenda discussion. 
Arguments for and against the introduction of this new mechanism will allow guiding 
principles for abbreviated criminal procedures to be formulated. 
 
1.4. Technical clarification of terms7 
For the purpose of this thesis, some key terms will be given the following meaning. By the 
expression ‘core international crimes’ (hereinafter CIC), I mean genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, such as specified in international legal documents like the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court.8 The term ‘serious human rights violations’ 
refers to violations of international human rights and humanitarian law which may amount 
to CIC. ‘Abbreviated criminal procedures’ (hereinafter ACP) are procedures within the 
criminal justice system that entail a significantly shortened approach to the processing of 
CIC cases, as opposed to the regular criminal procedure. It does not include certain other 
processes, as will be discussed below. The term ‘case file’ means there has been a 
registration and creation of a criminal file within the prosecutor's office. Criminal justice 
system (hereinafter CJS) is defined as collective institutions through which an accused 
offender passes until the accusations have been disposed of or punishment concluded.9 
Transitional justice is a response to systematic or widespread violations of human rights. It 
seeks recognition for victims and to promote possibilities for peace, reconciliation and 
democracy.10 
                                                 
6
  It should be noted that Colombia has an abbreviated legal framework to address core international crimes, 
discussed more thoroughly in the section 3.5. below. 
7
  For ease of use, abbreviations may be either singular or plural. 
8
  See ICC Statute, Articles 6, 7 and 8, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm [Visited 24 
November 2009]. 
9
  Black's Law Dictionary. Edited by Bryan A. Garner ... [et al.]. Deluxe Eighth Edition. Minnesota, Saint 
Paul, (West Group) 2004, p. 403. 
10
  See http://ictj.org/en/tj/#1 [Visited 24 August 2009]. 
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2. The background 
 
In order to contextualise the topic, this chapter gives information about the main 
developments in international criminal law and procedure that caused backlogs of CIC 
cases to emerge at the national level (section 2.1.). It further undertakes to present the 
challenge posed to national CJS by the high number of CIC committed (section 2.2.). In 
the end, it outlines some of the effects that backlogs have on different processes and 
expectations within the justice sector, victims’ communities and political establishment 
(section 2.3.). 
 
2.1. Developments in international law 
Ever since World War I, there has been a growing acceptance in the world’s legal 
community of the need for accountability of actors involved in serious violations of human 
rights law and international humanitarian law. After World War II, statutes were adopted 
to establish international military tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo for the just and 
prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals.11 During the Cold War period, 
although wars were waged and atrocities occurred, no international tribunals were 
established.12 In the 1990s, however, the United Nations Security Council, acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, created two international criminal tribunals, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter ICTY) and 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter ICTR).13 The perception was that 
these two ad hoc international tribunals, given the competence and impartiality of their 
international staff, were most suited to deal with the crimes committed in these two 
countries. 
As these tribunals developed, they shifted focus from lower or intermediate level 
perpetrators up the chain-of-command to the highest level suspects, to senior leaders 
suspected of being most responsible for crimes within their jurisdictions. By holding senior 
military and political leaders accountable for crimes, the Tribunals demonstrated that even 
                                                 
11
  Article 1 of the IMT Statute,  
http://www.jura.uni-muenchen.de/fakultaet/lehrstuehle/satzger/materialien/img1945e.pdf [Visited 24 
August 2009]. See also Article 1 of the IMTFE Statute, 
http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/theissen/pdf/IMTFEStatute.PDF [Visited 24 August 2009]. 
12
  One such conflict was in Cambodia. In 2001, the Cambodian National Assembly passed a law to create a 
court to try serious crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge regime during 1975-1979. See 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/law/4/KR_Law_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf [Visited 22 
August 2009]. 
13
  S/RES/827 and S/RES/955. 
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heads of state were not above the law.14 Due to this evolutionary process, they only 
touched the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the number of perpetrators actually 
processed. 
It is warranted to use the experience of the ICTY and ICTR to illustrate the main 
issues, problems and shortcomings of international procedures. According to Antonio 
Cassese: 
[The] two Ad Hoc Tribunals [...] were perceived as being marred by four 
essential flaws: i) their costly nature; ii) the excessive length of their 
proceedings; iii) their remoteness from the territory where crimes have been 
perpetrated and consequently the limited impact of their judicial output on 
the national populations concerned; iv) the unfocused character of the 
prosecutorial targets resulting in trials of a number of low-ranking 
defendants.15 
 
Cassese goes on to explain the ‘trend’ towards processing the majority of these 
cases at the national level, based on two grounds. First, national courts in the states 
concerned have become better equipped to handle such cases without bias. Second, the 
‘completion strategy’ adopted by the Security Council intended to close down the two ad 
hoc international tribunals and for national courts to increasingly take over their 
workload.16 Further strengthening the trend identified by Cassese is the principle of 
complementarity, enshrined in the ICC Statute, according to which the International 
Criminal Court (hereinafter ICC) will not exercise its jurisdiction unless states are either 
unwilling or unable to prosecute.17 The trend has thus shifted the burden of CIC 
prosecutions to the national level and caused the CJS in affected states to become 
overwhelmed with this complex type of criminal cases. 
 
2.2. Challenges of CIC prosecutions at the national level 
Violent conflicts usually involve commission of a high number of CIC involving a large 
number of perpetrators and their accomplices. These atrocities result in a large scale 
victimisation of civilians. When a territorial state directly affected by the crimes has a 
functional CJS, the responsible authorities should investigate and prosecute CIC cases. 
                                                 
14
  See http://www.icty.org/sid/287 [Visited 25 August 2009]. 
15
  Cassese, Antonio. International Criminal Law. Second Edition. Oxford, (Oxford University Press) 2008, 
p. 332. 
16
  Id., p. 341. 
17
  See the tenth preambular paragraph and Articles 1 and 17 of the ICC Statute. 
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Regardless of the universality principle18 and other grounds of jurisdiction, the 
investigation and prosecution of CIC should primarily be undertaken by the authorities in 
the country where the crimes were committed. This can lead to the subsequent opening of a 
significant number of case files within the CJS. At the same time, because almost all 
national CJS work with insufficient resources, the ability to process CIC cases will be 
limited. As a result, there may be a considerable discrepancy between the actual number of 
open CIC case files on the one hand, and the number of cases which the national 
jurisdiction has the capacity to actually process on the other. This will in most situations 
create a backlog of CIC cases. 
A backlog of cases raises several fundamental concerns. First, it is essential that the 
CJS keeps a complete overview of the number of cases in the backlog. Secondly, it is vital 
for the public trust in the CIC process that only the best suited cases19 are prioritised for 
full investigation and prosecution. If the cases are selected randomly or without apparent 
reason, expectations of justice are less likely to be met. Thirdly, in many situations the 
backlog of cases will be so large that a substantial percentage of the cases cannot go 
forward through the regular trial procedure. Suspects and witnesses alike may die or 
become too frail to stand or appear at trial. What should be done with these cases? Should 
they be removed from the CJS and dealt with through a non-judicial mechanism? Perhaps, 
one may conceive an ACP that enables the CJS itself to process CIC cases in a more time 
and cost effective manner, as may be required and legitimate. 
 
2.3. The effects of large case backlogs 
2.3.1. Justice sector reform 
CIC mostly happen in a situation where countries are in a state of war, where the rule of 
law and democracy are not functioning, or only partly functioning, resulting in a weak or 
even politically controlled judiciary, characterised by a loss or even non-existing capacity. 
This is also why these countries are labelled transitional. It means that they are trying to 
deal with the inglorious past and to re-establish the rule of law and respect for human 
                                                 
18
  Universal jurisdiction is the principle that every country has an interest in bringing to justice the 
perpetrators of grave crimes, no matter where the crime was committed, and regardless of the nationality 
of the perpetrators or their victims. See http://www.amnestyusa.org/international-justice/universal-
jurisdiction/page.do?id=1041148 [Visited 22 August 2009]. See also the preamble of the ICC Statute 
whereby it was pronounced that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those 
responsible for international crimes. 
19
  According to the applicable criteria that each country will develop depending upon its unique 
cirumstances. 
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rights principles. At the same time, they struggle to develop or strengthen the entire justice 
sector, which demands considerable capacity building.20 Even judges and prosecutors are 
less confident in their important roles, since they, too, are part of the reform process within 
the new legal, procedural and institutional set up. A judiciary going through a reform 
process, or being newly established after the reform, is more vulnerable to creation of a 
backlog of cases. 
 
2.3.2. Criminal justice system (CJS) 
Most legal systems have limited resources available for criminal justice reform and 
development. Reform and development processes in countries in transition occur 
concurrently with day to day operations of the CJS in question. Thus, there are competing 
priorities of work in such systems against the background of budgetary limitations and 
ever-changing expectations of justice among victims and others. If a country suffers from a 
severe pattern of violent crime or organized crime, it may be difficult to sustain support for 
investigation and prosecution of war crimes of the past. Conversely, if victims’ demands 
for criminal justice for atrocities are so high that priority is given to such prosecutions, it is 
likely to lead to fewer resources for other types of criminality and reform of the CJS. A 
strong demand for war crimes justice that contributes to a large backlog of cases can, 
therefore, have a negative impact on criminal justice reform and development. 
 
2.3.3. Public trust in the CJS 
Public trust in a CJS correlates to its ability to deal with the cases within it and keep the 
public informed.21 If the impression grows that cases do not move expeditiously and fairly 
through the CJS, the public will lose confidence. Trust in the CJS is fundamentally 
important for the public to be willing to fund, cooperate, and use it. If there has been a 
sustained, but futile effort to build trust in a CJS, for example in the wake of wars or period 
of authoritarian rule, then the whole effort to create a functional system that protects 
human rights and the rule of law may suffer a setback.22 And if a CJS has an exceptionally 
                                                 
20
  A comprehensive guidebook in Bosnian details issues related to transition in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The executive summary of the guidebook, in English, is available. See Transitional Justices Guidebook 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina: Executive summary. Convened by United Nations Development 
Programme. Sarajevo, June 2009, http://www.undp.ba/download.aspx?id=1703 [Visited 23 August 
2009]. 
21
  Id., pp. 19-20. 
22
  Id., p. 47. 
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large backlog of CIC cases that may also affect the overall trust in the ability of the system 
and undermine the entire transitional process. 
 
2.3.4. Victims and the management of expectation 
The role of victims is very important in the overall dynamics of facing the past and re-
healing the past wounds of atrocities. They play a crucial role as direct participants in 
criminal proceedings and in overall processes of transitional justice. Quite often the 
complexity of conflict creates different victim groups from different sides, each with their 
own interests and legitimate rights.23 In many situations where serious human rights 
violations occurred, marked by exceptional cruelty and its consequences, and where there 
is a particularly severe victimisation that must be rectified, interest for criminal justice and 
judicial truth24 is extremely high. Balancing general interests of justice and the competing 
demands of victims and the public is challenging. Often the existing mistrust towards 
governments and authorities in general, and its judicial branch in particular, only increases 
the tensions. Confidence building between victim groups and the judicial institutions is 
vital, however, especially against the background of a large backlog of cases within a 
judicial system that, from the victims’ perspective, is not doing enough to effectively 
resolve it. Giving false promises to victims can lead to further misunderstanding of the 
possibilities that exist both within and outside the criminal justice mechanisms. It is 
important to provide realistic information about the limitations of the existing mechanisms 
and try to seek innovative solutions to the problem.  
 
2.3.5. Political support and the national CIC process 
Processing CIC cases requires strong political support from the outset, both to ensure that 
undue political influences do not limit or undermine the process, and that necessary 
financial and other resources are allocated in a sufficient, timely manner.25 A large backlog 
of cases, and difficulty to show quantifiable results, can substantially weaken the necessary 
support of local politicians, representatives of public opinion. Even international donors 
                                                 
23
  For example, right to justice. See Independent study on best practices, including recommendations, to 
assist States in strengthening their domestic capacity to combat all aspects of impunity. Commissioned by 
the UN Secretary-General for the Commission on Human Rights, (E/CN.4/2004/88), 27 February 2004, 
paras. 24-56. 
24
  A process by which a legal and historical record of events and culpability of participants is made for use 
by the CJS and progeny. 
25
  Rule of Law Tools for Post-conflict States: Prosecution Initiatives. Convened by Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. New York and Geneva, 2006, p. 3. See 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/RuleoflawProsecutionsen.pdf [Visited 24 August 2009]. 
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supporting the transition process may fall prey to scepticism. This potentiality could 
subvert the entire prosecution process and bring uncertainty to the prospect of 
accountability for heinous crimes. Political groups initially seen as pillars of the 
prosecution process could also turn into sceptics when they see only a limited number of 
cases find their way from the labyrinths of justice or when there is no visible progress in 
the matter. The society affected with CIC has a fundamental interest to see that transitional 
processes bring measurable progress, as this can eventually lead to reconciliation and 
restoration of a functioning society. Even if these processes are moving forward, slow 
progress may cause politicians to feel hostage to the inabilities of the justice system, and 
consequently increase temptation to resolve a backlog of cases by political interventions, 
that, in turn, could negatively affect the overall development of the rule of law. 
 
 10 
3. The concept of ‘abbreviated criminal procedures’ (ACP) 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify components of a potential ACP for CIC. It 
initially describes expedited measures employed in international criminal procedure 
(section 3.1.). It then goes on to address practices that fall outside the scope of ACP as 
defined herein, but are still relevant to the discussion (section 3.2.). Some national criminal 
procedures for ordinary crimes that may have similar characteristics to ACP for CIC will 
follow (section 3.3.). Common features of these procedures are discussed (section 3.4.). 
The model for dealing with CIC cases used in Colombia will be presented (section 3.5.).  
The chapter finally specifies the basic features for a potential ACP for CIC (section 3.6.). 
 
3.1. Expedited measures in international criminal proceedings 
There is no such thing as ACP in the international criminal law. Nevertheless, noteworthy 
efforts have been made to develop means to expedite international criminal proceedings 
without compromising the fair trial rights of the accused.26 These may serve as an 
incentive for national actors to understand that innovative approaches may be acceptable 
and even advisable in dealing with lengthy criminal proceedings for CIC. 
 Because international criminal proceedings are extremely time consuming and 
expensive, mainly due to evidentiary requirements,27 judges and prosecutors realized that 
greater efficiency was imperative. For example, prosecutors in the ICTY pushed for greater 
use of certain existing mechanisms, and introduction of new ones, in order to remedy the 
issue, including, inter alia, the dossier approach, proof of fact other than by oral evidence, 
judicial notice of adjudicated facts, joint hearings, the use of electronic tools for the 
management of evidence and selection of relevant material at the pre-trial stage.28 Another 
example to combat inefficiency rises from the ICTY Statute. Because it contained few 
provisions of a procedural character, the judges were empowered to draft Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence governing the conduct of the proceedings, with an aim of 
                                                 
26
  See article by Nice, Geoffrey and Roland, Philippe Vallieres.  Procedural Innovationas in War Crimes 
Trials. In: The Dynamics of International Criminal Justice: Essays in Honour of Sir Richard May. Edited 
by Hirad Abtahi and Gideon Boas. Leiden, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) 2006. 
27
  Prosecutor v. Dražen Erdemović, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese to the Appeal 
Judgment, Case No.  IT-96-22, 7 October 1997, para. 8. See also Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, 
Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen to the Decision on Admissibility of Prosecution 
Investigator's Evidence in Milošević case, Case No. IT-02-54, 30 September 2002, para. 2. 
28
  For detailed elaboration of such mechanisms see article referred to in supra note 26, p. 147 onwards. 
 11 
safeguarding both fair and expedient trials. As the need for efficiency grew, the Rules were 
significantly amended.29  
Some rules are particularly interesting in the context of ACP for CIC. Rule 89(F) 
allows for receipt of evidence in written form when this is in the interests of justice. 
Though the Appeals Chamber made its applicability subject to certain stringent 
requirements,30 it could nevertheless considerably shorten the procedure if applied in an 
ACP for CIC. Further, Rule 94 does not require proof of facts of common knowledge or of 
adjudicated facts and documentary evidence from other proceedings of the Tribunal, but 
allows the taking of ‘judicial notice’ of facts, such as for example those characterizing 
historical and background information not subject to reasonable dispute.31 In this regard, 
the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Momčilo Perišić stated, ‘[W]hen taking judicial notice, 
the Trial Chamber must balance such interests [i.e. judicial economy and harmonization of 
the Tribunal’s judgments] with the right of the accused to a fair trial.’32 
 The lawyers who helped establish the ICC wanted to mitigate the problems of 
protracted proceedings. Therefore, even before the first judges took up their mandate, this 
group prepared a report that set forth measures to reduce the length of the proceedings.33 
The report covered all aspects of ICC criminal procedure. Some solutions are extensively 
used in national jurisdictions to promote judicial economy, such as developing prosecution 
strategy at the outset or opting for concerted rather than fragmented trials. The report also 
suggested use of mechanisms provided for in the ICC Statute or Rules of Court previously 
employed in other international tribunals, such as live witness testimony via video-link or 
making greater use of judicial notice. It encouraged the ICC overall to develop its own 
interpretation of the existing imprecise rules and make greater use of written statements 
and testimony in lieu of oral testimony, documentary evidence, and unsworn statements of 
the accused, providing at all times the sufficient protection of due process. 
                                                 
29
  For detailed and taxitive elaboration of the relevant rules and their application, see article by Robinson, 
Patrick L. Fair but Expeditious Trials. In book referred to in supra note 26, p. 176 onwards. 
30
  Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal on the Admissibility of Evidence- In-
Chief in the Form of Written Statements, Case No. IT-02-54, 30 September 2003. 
31
  Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated 
Facts, Case No. IT-02-54-T, 16 April 2003. 
32
  Prosecutor v. Momčilo Perišić, Decision on Motion for Judicial Notice of ICTY Convictions, Case No. 
IT-04-81-PT, 25 September 2008, para. 7. 
33
  Friman, Hakan ... [et al.]. Informal expert paper: Measures Available to the International Criminal Court 
to Reduce the Length of the Proceedings. ICC-OTP 2003. 
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 It is significant that international lawyers have acknowledged the pressing need to 
develop mechanisms for more expedient international criminal proceedings. As Geoffrey 
Nice and Philippe Vallieres-Roland stated in their article, to achieve this goal,  
[T]here must be a healthy dose of open-mindedness and greater willingness 
of international criminal lawyers and judges to depart from preconceived 
ideas based on either common or civil law systems. Most significantly 
perhaps, international criminal courts must be prepared to question the 
assumption that all evidence must be heard orally if there is to be any chance 
of trials being concluded expeditiously.34 
 
3.2. Institutes outside the scope of the thesis but nevertheless relevant to the 
discussion 
In this section I will present several processes not embraced by the idea of ACP for CIC. 
These include traditional plea negotiations (section 3.2.1.), truth and reconciliation 
commissions (section 3.2.2.) and gacaca courts in Rwanda (section 3.2.3.). The extensive 
use of these processes could be legally, politically and socially acceptable in some 
countries and situations, particularly where there are no functioning CJS to dictate higher 
standards of judicial scrutiny. In my opinion, although each reduces the quantum of justice 
and should not be encouraged in practice except on an exceptional basis, they are 
important to examine because their objectives are to address backlogs of cases in a 
qualitatively and institutionally different setting. 
 
3.2.1. Traditional plea negotiations 
Traditional plea negotiations (hereinafter TPN) have similarity to the concept of 
‘abbreviated criminal procedure’ because their main purpose is to expedite the criminal 
procedure and save resources. As Michael P. Scharf, in his article Trading Justice for 
Efficiency, said: 
[W]hile no single definition of the term is universally accepted, the practice 
may encompass negotiation over reduction of sentence, dropping some or all 
of the charges, or reducing the charges in turn for admitting guilt, conceding 
certain facts, foregoing an appeal or providing cooperation in another 
criminal case.35 
 
Accordingly, TPN may take the form of a plea bargaining, charge bargaining and 
fact bargaining between prosecutor and accused, where the latter waives some rights in 
                                                 
34
  Supra note 26, p. 144. 
35
  Journal of International Criminal Justice 2(4), 2004, pp. 1070-1081, at 1070. 
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exchange for a certain benefit, mostly a reduced sentence. In this voluntary procedure the 
accused must be fully appraised of the consequences. Negotiation results in a plea 
agreement. The court may accept the agreement, in which case there will be no main trial 
and the agreed sentence, even below the statutory minimum, will be imposed. If the court 
rejects the agreement, the main trial takes place with no consequence to the accused, 
especially with respect to the presumption of innocence. 
In an ACP for CIC context, the features of TPN concerning voluntariness and 
sentence reduction are worth consideration in order to promote fairness from the 
perspective of the accused. TPN, however, may have substantial shortcomings. First, TPN 
may not contribute sufficiently to the reconciliation process through the complete 
establishment of historical truth. This is especially so with charge bargaining, where, for 
example, charges for one crime are dropped in exchange for a plea to a lesser crime. A 
factual basis for the more serious crime may therefore not emerge. In ACP for CIC, the 
judgment would have to involve the judicial determination of all the facts relevant for the 
case at issue. Furthermore, a TPN always results in conviction, whereas in ACP for CIC 
the possibility of acquittal still remains. 
The TPN process may not fulfil the interests of victims, particularly if a defendant 
pleads to a lesser crime. Also, TPN may not fully address victims’ needs for reparations or, 
as indicated above, the creation of an historical record. These are deficiencies that must be 
avoided for an ACP for CIC to be successful from the perspective of those most harmed by 
CIC.  
Procedurally, TPN may be linked to other problems. This was especially the case in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. When TPN was first introduced in its civil law based system, the 
procedural rights of the accused were not sufficiently safeguarded.36 Also, in many cases, 
plea agreements were concluded at the end of the main trial.37 The main function of an 
ACP, abbreviation, was therefore thwarted. 
Recently, some writers have tried to introduce the idea of the newly designed plea 
negotiations so as to include ‘the three key restorative-justice elements – truth-telling, 
                                                 
36
  For more details, see Plea Agreements in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Practices before the Courts and their 
compliance with international human rights standards. Convened by OSCE Mission to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Second edition. Sarajevo, May 2006. 
37
  Good example of this practice may be found in the case of Prosecutor v. Paško Ljubičić, tried before the 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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victim participation and reparation’.38 The term ‘traditional plea negotiations’ was 
therefore intentionally employed as a means to set apart this old practice from these new 
ideas that, although not termed ‘abbreviated criminal procedure’, come very close to what 
this expression is meant to embody. 
 
3.2.2. Truth and reconciliation commissions 
Truth and reconciliation commissions (hereinafter TRC) are alternative, non-criminal 
justice mechanisms. In practice they are bodies set up to establish historical truth about 
past serious human rights violations occurring over a certain period of time in a given 
country. According to the definition given by Priscilla B. Hayner, TRC do not focus on a 
specific event, but attempt to paint the overall picture of certain human rights abuses, or 
violations of international humanitarian law.39 Consequently, TRC may exist alongside 
criminal prosecutions and even help generate information that may lead to such 
prosecutions.  
TRC are always vested with some sort of authority that allows them greater access 
to information, greater security or protection to dig into sensitive issues, and a greater 
impact with its report.40 However, although they possess some of the qualities inherent to 
judicial organs, such as impartiality, independence and competence, they are not created as 
part of the CJS. They cannot pronounce on specific crimes, legally determine the guilt of 
individual perpetrators, or mete out criminal sanctions. This is generally because they do 
not afford the required degree of due process guarantees that are indispensible in criminal 
proceedings where verdicts of guilt are made. Therefore, TRC do not accomplish one of 
the main tasks of ACP for CIC, namely, to actually process CIC cases. This does not mean 
that TRC do not serve an important purpose, only that the backlog of open CIC case files 
cannot be resolved by means of TRC. 
TRC are usually temporary and established for a pre-defined period of time, 
ceasing to exist with the submission of a report of its findings.41 It would be reasonable to 
ask whether it would be better to invest in already existing permanent institutions inside 
the CJS that may only need strengthening, rather than invest in ad hoc institutions with 
                                                 
38
  Combs, Nancy Amoury. Guilty Pleas In International Criminal Law: Constructing a Restorative Justice 
Approach. Palo Alto, (Stanford University Press) 2007. 
39
  Transitional Justice: How emerging democracies recon with former regimes. Edited by Neil J. Kritz. 
Washington, D.C., (United States Institute of Peace Press), Volume I (1995), p. 225. 
40
  Ibid. 
41
  Ibid. 
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limited objectives and timeframes. In addition, transitional justice countries have limited 
resources to build their institutional capacity. Parallelism can create unnecessary 
competition regarding internal resources and potential international donations. 
Strengthening the ability to achieve a higher output from existing CJS procedures, perhaps 
by investing in ACP mechanisms, might be preferable for society in the long-term. 
The mandate of a TRC usually sets its purpose and scope of activities. 
‘Commissions have generally pursued five goals: creating an authoritative record that 
acknowledges past abuses; providing redress and platform for victims; making 
recommendations for institutional reform; contributing to accountability of and justice for 
perpetrators; and promoting national reconciliation.’42 All these goals except, perhaps, 
recommendations for institutional reform, may also be achieved in the course of an ACP. 
Perhaps even more is possible. For example, a TRC makes a finding in its final report, but 
its ultimate impact depends on whether it is acknowledged as the truth by the relevant 
government. ‘Knowledge that is officially sanctioned, and thereby made “part of the public 
cognitive scene” ... acquires a mysterious quality that is not there when it is merely “truth”. 
Official acknowledgement at least begins to heal the wounds.’43 As opposed to the TRC 
report, a judgment pronounced in an ACP does not require such an acknowledgement. 
Judicial truth simply cannot be disregarded by the government of a state which aspires to 
demonstrate adherence to the qualities of rule of law democracy. 
 
3.2.3. Gacaca system of courts in Rwanda 
Gacaca emerged from a resolution of the new Rwandan government to oppose any idea of 
amnesty and to choose the path of accountability against the background of the patent 
inability of its regular courts to deal with an extreme caseload (80,000 detainees awaiting 
trial in 2005). Although historically it represented the traditional method of community 
dispute resolution, gacaca for CIC is an innovative and considerably shortened approach 
that embodies elements of both restorative and retributive justice. 
Gacaca was set up by the 2001 Organic Law, which was significantly amended in 
2004.44 Its preamble recognizes the necessity, in order to achieve reconciliation and justice, 
to permanently eradicate the culture of impunity and enable prosecutions and trials of 
                                                 
42
  Steven R. Ratner, Jason S. Abrams & James L. Bischoff. Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in 
International Law. Third edition. Oxford, (Oxford University Press) 2009, p. 263. 
43
  Supra note 39, p. 228. 
44
  Organic Law No. 40/2000 of 26/01/2001 and Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004. 
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perpetrators and accomplices, aiming for simple punishment and reconstitution of the 
Rwandese society after genocide. An ACP for CIC should undoubtedly focus on similar 
goals to those set forth above. Gacaca panels are composed of 9 persons of integrity and 5 
deputies, at least 21 years old (Art.14)45. These are lay judges who receive limited legal 
training. In total, 170,000 judges sit on approximately 10,000 panels. The scope of the 
atrocities in Rwanda warrants a dilution of expertise in the composition of panels that 
cannot be tolerated in an ACP for CIC, which as an integral part of a CJS would require 
higher standards of professionalism. 
Common features exist for all the hearings before gacaca courts. As a rule, the 
hearings in gacaca courts are public. Internal decisions and deliberations of judges, 
however, are made in secret (Art.21). At the hearing, the defendant will always be made 
cognizant of the charges. The president of the session will give a summary of the nature of 
the case and evidence establishing guilt. Defendants that do not confess will be will be 
given opportunity to give their defence. Witnesses will be heard under oath, as well as 
evidence from the Public Prosecution if it is summoned to the trial. Any interested person 
may ask questions and the defendant must answer (Arts. 64 onwards). Once hearings are 
closed, the court retires for deliberations and makes decisions on the same or following 
day. The judgments or decisions taken are pronounced publicly. 
Excluding the judges’ deliberations, the gacaca procedure is open and transparent, 
much as any ACP for CIC should be. The broad participatory nature of gacaca will likely 
be impossible to replicate in the ACP for CIC context where professionals are charged to 
conduct the proceedings. In addition, certain features of gacaca are wholly contrary to fair 
trial principles that must be embedded in any ACP for CIC, where, for example, no 
defendant can ever be compelled to testify or denied counsel. 
Article 51 classifies the accused in three categories. The first and second categories 
involve high and medium level actors, respectively, together with their accomplices, while 
the third category involves persons who only committed offences against property. The 
first category of the accused falls outside the competence of the gacaca courts. However, 
the law creates punishments for this category because a determination that a person falls 
within it can in some cases be made during the information-gathering pre-trial stage. Those 
individuals shall be entitled to the sentencing scheme established for them by the gacaca 
legislation. The community is involved in developing a list of accused individuals and 
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placing them in the above-mentioned categories. In an ACP for CIC, as in gacaca, it may 
be advisable and even necessary to adopt a classification scheme for different levels of 
participation in CIC when deciding which cases will be tried in regular procedure and 
which will go to the abbreviated process. 
The gacaca law encourages accused persons to make use of the procedure of 
confessions, guilty pleas, repentance and apologies (hereinafter confessions). Confessions, 
to be accepted, must give a detailed description of the offence, reveal the co-authors and 
accomplices, and provide any other information useful to the exercise of the public action. 
The accused has to apologize to the Rwandan society for the offences that s/he has 
committed (Art.54). This truth-telling function will serve as a valuable therapeutic 
modality for those who are damaged by CIC, although such damages will forever remain. 
All gacaca panels apply the same substantive criminal law applied by the national 
courts. However, the law provides a special sentencing regime. Defendants falling within 
the first category, who refused to confess, or whose confessions have been rejected, incur a 
death penalty or life imprisonment. Those who confessed incur sentences ranging from 
twenty-five to thirty years of imprisonment (Art.72). Defendants that fall into the second 
category are entitled to commutation of sentence, depending on whether they confessed 
and, if they did, whether they did so before or after their name appeared on the list of 
suspected persons. One half of their significantly reduced prison sentence will be 
commuted into community service (Art.73). Category three defendants are only 
responsible for civil reparation (Art.75). Persons convicted of genocide or crimes against 
humanity are liable to the withdrawal of civil rights (Art.76). The legal remedies available 
to defendants are opposition, appeal and review of judgment (Art.85). The above 
provisions illustrate the type of flexible approach to sanctions that an ACP for CIC may 
emulate. 
Gacaca has been widely criticised by human rights NGOs such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch.46 Main causes of criticism concern the right to 
legal defence, competence, independence and impartiality, the search for truth, and 
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  See, for example, Law and reality: Progress in Judicial Reform in Rwanda. Report by Human Rights 
Watch, 24 July 2008, Chapter IX, http://www.hrw.org/en/node/62097/section/1 [Visited 25 August 2009]. 
See also Meyerstein, Ariel. Between Law and Culture: Rwanda’s Gacaca and Postcolonial Legality. In: 
Law & Social Inquiry, Volume 32, Issue 2 (2007), pp. 467–508. 
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Rwanda's commitment to international obligations.47 William A. Schabas, in his article 
Genocide Trials and Gacaca Courts, expresses his concerns as follows: 
Yet, the terrible and totally unexpected result of the gacaca pilot process was 
not to provide the fabled ‘closure’ but rather to reveal that the numbers of 
those responsible for genocide may have exceeded 100,000 by a factor of 10. 
Rather than resolve the outstanding cases, and end the blight of mass 
detentions under appalling conditions, the initial gacaca hearings appear to 
have opened a Pandora’s box.48 
 
In January 2006, it was reported that 4,162 individuals have been adjudged.49 It 
seems that if gacaca is destined to be successful, the pace of adjudications will have to 
increase exponentially. 
 
3.3. Similar national criminal procedures (for ordinary crimes) 
German, Polish and Italian codes of criminal procedure illustrate different national 
approaches to abbreviated criminal procedures outside the area of CIC. This allows a 
certain extent of analogy with ACP for CIC. The instruments employed in these selected 
examples may help serve in the development of an eventual ACP for CIC. The subsequent 
comparative discussion describes main features of these selected models. 
 
3.3.1. Procedures in German law 
Germany uses two abbreviated criminal procedures, penal order and accelerated procedure. 
These procedures apply to simple offences and require indisputable clarity of evidence. 
Since CIC cases are much more complex, features of the German models, while 
illustrative, may not suit an ACP for CIC without modification. 
 
3.3.1.1. Penal order 
A penal order is an order issued by a judge that has the same effect as a judgment of 
conviction following a trial. The German Code of Criminal Procedure envisages the 
procedure for penal order where public charges are judicially determined through the use 
                                                 
47
  For details and references see Henry J. Steiner, Philip Alston & Ryan Goodman. International Human 
Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals. Third edition. Oxford, (Oxford University Press), p. 1323. 
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  3 Journal of International Criminal Justice  (2005), pp. 879-895, at 881. 
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  Drumbl, Mark A. Atrocity, Punishment and International Law. Cambridge, (Cambridge University Press) 
2007, p. 85. 
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of written proceedings, with no main hearing taking place.50 If the prosecutor does not 
consider a main hearing to be necessary, s/he may file written application to this effect, 
including the desired legal consequence (Sec.407). If the accused objects, or the judge 
either deviates from the prosecutor’s assessment or wishes to impose a different legal 
consequence, a main hearing will take place. Otherwise, the judge will comply with the 
prosecutor’s application and issue the penal order (Sec.408). After a penal order is served, 
an accused may object within two weeks. Without such objection, the order shall be 
equivalent to a judgment entered into force following the main hearing (Sec.410). If the 
objection is admissible, a main hearing will be scheduled where the defendant may be 
represented by counsel (Sec.411). 
This procedure may be consistent with a potential ACP for CIC, the specific 
components of which are set forth below.51 For example, a brief written procedure in lieu 
of a lengthy hearing based on oral testimony would by definition be ‘abbreviated’, and 
prone to help resolve large numbers of cases. Also, defendant’s rights to a main hearing 
and counsel are protected. S/he may choose, however, to waive these rights and shorten the 
process.52 On the other hand, penal orders usually involve lesser offences. Their content 
does not create the type of detailed record necessary in CIC cases that are inherently more 
serious. And even though the judge is acting for the benefit of society, the German penal 
order procedure seems not to address the rights and expectations of victims, a necessary 
component for a potential ACP for CIC. 
 
3.3.1.2. Accelerated procedure 
When the factual situation or the clarity of evidence warrants an immediate hearing, the 
prosecutor will file an application for an accelerated decision, dispensing with intermediary 
proceedings, and the main hearing shall be held immediately or on short notice (Sec.417). 
The charges may be presented by indictment or orally on the record at the beginning of the 
main hearing. If it is anticipated that imprisonment of at least 6 months may be imposed, 
                                                 
50
  Criminal Procedure Code (Strafprozeßordnung, StPO), Part Six, Chapter I; translation provided by the 
Federal Ministry of Justice. See https://www.unodc.org/tldb/showDocument.do?documentUid=2274 
[Visited 22 August 2009]. 
51
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No. IT-02-65-PT, 2 June 2003, para. 15 (c). 
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defence counsel shall be appointed if the accused is not already represented (Sec.418). A 
judge’s decision regarding this procedure may only be issued until judgment is pronounced 
in the main hearing, and may not be contested. On refusal, the court may decide to open 
main proceedings (Sec.419). Oral recitation of charges may be considered unacceptable in 
a potential ACP for CIC because the factual basis of the indictment will likely be complex. 
‘[An] indictment is pleaded with sufficient particularity only if it sets out the material facts 
of the Prosecution case with enough detail to inform a defendant clearly of the charges 
against him or her so that he or she may prepare his or her defence.’53 In ACP for CIC, as a 
matter of due process, it stands to reason that the best way to provide the detail necessary 
for preparation of an adequate defence is with a written indictment. 
In the German accelerated procedure, records of an earlier examination as well as 
of documents containing written statements may be used, so long as defendant, defendant’s 
counsel and the prosecutor consent, provided they were present at the main hearing. 
However, the judge determines the extent to which evidence shall be taken (Sec.420). In 
the context of ACP for CIC, using this aspect of the German accelerated procedure would 
be significant in reducing the time required for adjudication, unless defendant’s due 
process rights of cross-examination would be curtailed. Further, when necessary, a 
mechanism should be provided to allow either party to offer additional direct and/or 
rebuttal evidence when the interests of justice require. 
 
3.3.2. Procedures in Polish law 
The Polish Code of Criminal Procedure54 has several instruments to simplify criminal 
procedure. I selected two that might have relevance in the CIC context, and that were not 
addressed by the German models. They are, namely, motion to convict without a trial and 
voluntary submission to a penalty. 
Polish criminal procedure provides that the prosecutor, with consent of the accused, 
may attach to the indictment a motion that the accused be convicted without a trial 
(Art.335). The penalty can be significantly reduced in this process. Other penal measures 
may also be imposed, inter alia, deprivation of public rights; prohibition from exercise of 
or engagement in specific posts professions or economic activities; obligation to redress 
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  Nahimana et al. v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment of 28 November 2007, para. 322. 
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  Act of 6 June 1997, https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/polish_ccp.pdf [Visited 22 August 2009]. 
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damage; and/or supplementary payment to the injured the public.55 This procedure is 
allowed if evidence of guilt is beyond doubt and the accused is sufficiently repentant so 
that the objectives of the proceedings will be achieved despite lack of a trial. 
Certain elements of this model could be included in a potential ACP for CIC. An 
unequivocal and voluntary waiver by the accused of the right to trial would satisfy due 
process. The allowance for imposition of alternative punishment may address the rights of 
victims, the public, or both. Alternative punishment will reduce the costs of 
imprisonment.56 
The Polish procedure also allows for voluntary submission by an accused to a 
specified penalty or penal measure, without evidentiary proceedings. The accused makes a 
motion for this to occur, but can only do so until the conclusion of the first examination at 
the first instance hearing (Art.387). The court may grant the motion only when the 
circumstances surrounding the offence give no rise to doubt, the state prosecutor and the 
injured party concur, and the objectives of the proceedings are to be achieved despite the 
hearing not being conducted in full. When granting the motion the court may regard as 
admitted the evidence specified in the indictment or documents submitted by a party. 
For purposes of a potential ACP for CIC, having the injured party concur in the 
foregoing procedure helps establish transparency, openness and legitimacy from the 
victim’s perspective. Provided the requirements are met, both Polish procedures exhibit a 
flexibility that may reduce backlogs, which is also a major aim of ACP for CIC. 
 
3.3.3. ‘Giudizio abbreviato’ in Italian law 
The Italian Code of Criminal Procedure57 has a special procedure in which the Preliminary 
Hearing Judge (hereinafter PHJ), without entering into the main trial phase, delivers a 
judgment on the basis of the indictment filed by the prosecutor and the material contained 
in the prosecutor’s file. The only necessary requirement for ‘giudizio abbreviato’ to take 
place is the request of the defendant. ‘Giudizio abbreviato’ is an option available for any 
charge, including those punishable by life imprisonment. The request must be expressed 
after issuance, but before confirmation of the indictment (Art.438). The purpose of this 
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 The Italian Code of Criminal Procedure (Codice procedura penale) is not available in English. An           
unofficial translation of relevant sections is located in Annex A. See Italian version at 
https://www.unodc.org/tldb/showDocument.do?documentUid=3081 [Visited 22 August 2009]. 
 22 
procedure is to avoid often lengthy main trial proceedings and, in particular, the 
presentation of the evidence at the trial. The defendant, by accepting to be judged without 
all the guarantees of a fair trial, gets a reduced sentence in return (Art.442).  
There are two exceptions to the issuance of a judgment exclusively on the basis of 
the prosecutor’s file, and they reduce the advantages of ‘giudizio abbreviato’ in terms of 
procedural economy. Either the defendant or the judge may seek acquisition of additional 
evidence (Arts.438, 441). The prosecutor may then offer evidence in rebuttal or amend the 
indictment if different facts arise, or a connected crime or aggravated circumstance 
emerges. If the prosecutor submits new accusations, the accused can ask that the 
proceedings continue in the ordinary course, including the main trial (Art.441bis). 
In this abbreviated procedure, the right to appeal is limited as well. The accused 
and the prosecutor cannot appeal an acquittal, and the prosecutor cannot appeal a guilty 
judgment (Art.443). 
The preliminary hearing in ‘giudizio abbreviato’ in effect becomes the hearing in 
which the criminal responsibility of the defendant is assessed. The PHJ may become the 
one who both acquires the evidence and issues the judgment, thus greatly streamlining the 
procedure. In other regards, this Italian model offers examples relevant when designing a 
potential ACP for CIC. First, reduced penalties may serve as strong incentives for 
defendants to be willing to make use of an ACP for CIC, thus increasing the ability to 
resolve more cases. Second, because the defendant requests such a procedure, the danger 
of infringement of fair trial principles would be alleviated. Third, while the duration of the 
procedure would be considerably shortened, the full establishment of facts in the final 
judicial determination would not be compromised. The possibility remains that either the 
accused, the prosecutor or the court can seek additional evidence. This promotes the truth-
telling element of judicial determination, important to the fairness of the process as a 
whole. 
 
3.4. Common features of the German, Polish and Italian solutions 
Certain common elements that occur in the various models presented above should likely 
be considered for a potential ACP for CIC. The evidence is mainly presented in written 
form, but the case could also be decided on hearing. From a practical and realistic 
standpoint, a hearing is probably more suitable for deciding CIC cases because of their 
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nature and scope.58 However, the length of the procedures is considerably shortened since 
there are no regular hearings as a general rule, or when written evidence is available and its 
use is agreed on by the participants. If the consent or the request by the accused for such a 
procedure is not specifically envisaged, there is always a remedy available, namely, a full 
trial. The reduction of penalties in some models could also serve as a powerful incentive 
for an accused to make use of such procedures, especially when the prosecution’s case is 
undoubtedly strong. The possibility of alternative sentences should be available as well to 
provide an appropriate degree of flexibility. 
It would be important that a potential ACP for CIC be regulated by criminal law 
and administered within the CJS, such as the case with the presented models. This would 
ensure that case files remain in the CJS, meaning there will be a judicial or prosecutorial 
record of the decision that possesses a sufficiently detailed determination of the charges 
and facts in the case at hand. Finally, the right to appeal should be guaranteed. 
 
3.5. The Colombian experience: Can ACP work for CIC?  
Colombia has developed a form of ACP for CIC. It did so to address the interests that arose 
in its unique CIC context. An examination of its ACP for CIC reveals that it is designed for 
use in situations where the defendant does not intend to contest culpability. The Colombian 
experience, though born out of its internal conflict, may assist other states that seek to 
develop their own country specific ACP for CIC systems.  
 
3.5.1. The backlog of core international crimes cases in Colombia 
During the Colombian armed conflict, various actors committed atrocities against the 
civilian population. More than 100,000 people were victimised by different atrocious 
crimes, including massacres, forced disappearances, sexual violence, torture and arbitrary 
detention. Approximately 3,000,000 victims were internally displaced.59 Consequently, the 
State needed to address these matters. Peace negotiations between the government and 
illegal armed groups,60 held in 2002, resulted in demobilization of 35 paramilitary groups 
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and over 30,000 individuals belonging to them.61 A law was also passed, the Justice and 
Peace Law (hereinafter JPL),62 that developed a special framework63 to provide for the 
investigation and prosecution of CIC perpetrated by demobilized members of illegal armed 
groups.64 
The Colombian armed conflict resulted in a large backlog of CIC cases, consisting 
of the cases brought against demobilized members of armed groups under JPL, outside of 
it, and cases against non-demobilised individuals to be addressed by ordinary criminal 
procedure.65 By January 2007, there were over 100,000 cases before the Justice and Peace 
Prosecutor.66 
 
3.5.2. The Colombian JPL special procedure 
The peace negotiations mentioned above were marked by conflicting interests of different 
actors. Armed groups were not ready to accept any accountability measures for their 
criminal acts, threatening to resume violence if such measures were to be imposed. At the 
same time, national and international NGOs and victims’ organizations were strongly 
opposed to any solution that might result in the eventual impunity or de facto or de jure 
amnesties.67 The JPL framework sought to address these tensions and incorporated many 
important elements of an ACP for CIC. Among other things, these include both the 
victim’s right to truth, justice and reparations, and the requirements of peace and individual 
or collective reintegration into civilian life of the members of armed groups (Art.1).68 
 Within the framework of a potential ACP for CIC, when enacting the required 
legislation, one possible solution might be to designate special judicial and prosecutorial 
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  JPL was significantly amended by the rulings of the Constitutional Court, made upon requests and 
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paramilitaries. 
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units inside the CJS to undertake the corresponding actions to implement the adopted 
procedure. In Colombia, JPL created the Superior Judicial District Courts for Justice and 
Peace Matters (Art.32) and the National Prosecutorial Unit for Justice and Peace 
(Art.33), for example. It is also important to set criteria for determination whether the case 
is suitable for ACP. Not every case will be. JPL set eligibility requirements for individuals 
to avail themselves its benefits according to a list provided by the government (Art. 10 and 
11).69 
The JPL procedure has additional distinctive elements for an ACP for CIC. First, it 
has a truth-telling function that is irreplaceable to the victims,70 commencing with a 
spontaneous declaration and confession given before the prosecutor delegate. This 
requires that persons shall describe the circumstances of time, manner, and place in which 
they participated in the criminal acts committed on occasion of their membership in their 
armed groups, and for which they avail themselves of this law. To ensure completeness 
and accuracy, the truthfulness of their confessions are subject to verification. 
Second, JPL entails a simplified procedure that saves time and resources while 
affording due process. A demobilized person shall immediately be placed at the disposal of 
the judge who, within thirty-six hours, shall schedule and hold a hearing (Art.17) during 
which the prosecutor shall make a factual indictment. The prosecutor then undertakes to 
investigate and verify the facts admitted by the accused. On completion of these tasks, s/he 
will ask the judge to schedule an indictment hearing, within ten days (Art.18). The accused 
may accept the charges. The determination of whether such acceptance was free, 
voluntary, spontaneous, and assisted by defence counsel will be made in a public, 
transparent hearing. Upon such determination, a hearing for sentencing and imposition of 
penalty shall be scheduled within ten days. If the accused does not accept the charges, the 
case shall be forwarded to the ordinary criminal procedure (Art.19). The right to defence is 
guaranteed through the mechanisms of the Public Defender Service (Art.34), yet another 
minimum guarantee of due process that JPL provides. 
Third, JPL procedure involves victims’ participation and attends to their respective 
interests. During the hearing, they can make an express request for an interlocutory 
proceeding regarding reparations resulting from the criminal conduct. Reparations may 
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  Eligibility requirements were made stricter by the Constitutional Court ruling; see Ruling C-370 as cited 
by Pablo Kalmanovic, supra note 66, p. 16. 
70
  Supra note 23, paras. 14-23. See also Naqvi, Yasmin. The right to the truth in international law: fact or 
fiction? In: International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 88, Number 862, June 2006, pp. 245-273. 
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include restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-
repetition. The decision on this request will be incorporated into the verdict (Art.23). The 
JPL also creates a Fund for the Reparation of Victims, made up of all the assets or 
resources that may be surrendered by persons or illegal armed groups, resources from the 
national budget, and donations in cash and in kind, both national and foreign (Art.54). 
Throughout the JPL process, victims also have a right to be heard, to have legal assistance, 
and to be informed of the course and outcome of the proceedings (Art.37). In this way, the 
requirement for transparency and openness of the proceedings is facilitated, more so 
because the law further contemplates means for conservation of archives for historical 
purposes. These include the duty of memory and specific measures for preserving the 
archives and facilitating access thereto (Chapter X). 
 Finally, JPL creates a special sentencing regime whereby execution of sentence 
determined in the respective judgment shall be suspended and replaced with an alternative 
sentence of imprisonment of at least five years and not greater than eight years, based on 
the seriousness of the crimes and defendant’s effective collaboration in their clarification 
(Art.29). Defendant will be required to make a commitment to contribute to her/his re-
socialization, to promote activities geared to the demobilization of the armed group of 
which s/he was a member, as well as not to commit the crimes for which s/he was 
convicted. These components of reduced and alternative sentences that deter, but also 
contribute to reconciliation processes, might be further explored within an ACP for CIC. 
 
3.6. Conclusion: basic features for potential ACP for CIC 
Based on the information and analysis provided, it is possible to envisage certain basic 
features that a potential ACP for CIC should possess to serve the public’s interest that 
justice be done in a fair and expeditious manner.  
First, in order to comply with the principle of legality71 such procedures should be 
prescribed by law and made an integral part of the CJS.72 Being part of the CJS will require 
that ACP be administered by regular courts, without creating extra-judicial mechanisms or 
additional institutional layers. However, depending on the particular needs of the 
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  Supra note 15, Chapter 2, Sections 2.3.-2.5., pp. 36-52. 
72
  They may be specifically designed to resolve the particular backlog of cases and therefore be introduced 
through a special legislation. Alternatively, they may be introduced through amendments to the existing 
legislation. 
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jurisdiction, some judiciaries may decide to have specially designed panels of judges 
and/or corresponding prosecutorial units.  
There may be differences of opinion regarding the issue of whether ACP should 
apply to all CIC, or restrictively applied. In any event, the legal regulation should 
specifically elaborate which categories of CIC may fall under these proceedings, according 
to clear criteria. Differences in classification were considered in the gacaca process in 
Rwanda. In an ACP for CIC, it may be appropriate to distinguish between more serious 
CIC cases that violate individual life or physical integrity (murder, extermination, torture, 
rape) from less serious cases, where the interest violated is property (pillaging or 
destruction), freedom of movement (displacement of a civilian population or an unlawful 
deportation) and, maybe, personal liberty (unlawful detention). Furthermore, it is important 
to distinguish between different modes of individual criminal responsibility of a 
perpetrator. It may be found that different treatment should be imposed on actors such as 
masterminds, leaders and superiors, direct perpetrators and those who aided, abetted or 
induced the commission of these crimes. There is also a spectrum between the different 
consequences of CIC for victims, ranging, for example, from the destruction of the whole 
group to the destruction of property. 
Second, ACP for CIC should increase the ability of CJS to resolve large numbers of 
cases that have created a backlog. This entails that the procedure should be simplified to 
the extent possible. Actual time used for adjudicating a case should be considerably 
reduced. One way to accomplish this is by limiting oral presentation of evidence, so long 
as it is in balance with the fair trial rights of the accused. 
Third, ACP for CIC must be voluntary and non-coercive, based on fundamental fair 
trial principles of due process. The defendant must have the opportunity to opt out. 
Nevertheless, certain deviations in the quantum of due process may be permissible. ‘A 
defendant is entitled to a fair trial, but not a perfect one.’73 
Fourth, ACP for CIC should be transparent and open. Unless absolutely necessary 
to protect the safety of a witness or a similar interest, the public should have access to all 
proceedings, including the pronouncement of the final judgment. Extensive use of court 
outreach and similar methods should be utilized in order to satisfy the public interest in 
having an appropriate degree of insight in the organization, the course and the outcome of 
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  Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953); Decided 9 February 1953. 
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such procedure.74 For example, when documentary evidence is used, summaries should be 
made available for public scrutiny and education. 
Fifth, ACP for CIC should be designed as a part of a wider transitional justice 
process. Several main issues should be addressed in this context. The purpose of the 
process, and its details and outcomes, should be explained to victims’ groups and the 
general public. Beyond mere explanation, the procedure should actively address victims’ 
claims for justice, truth, apologies and reparations. From a societal standpoint, the 
procedure should help establish judicial truth by creating an historical and legal record 
with judgments containing factual and legal findings that should not be significantly 
different than those issued in regular criminal procedure. 
Sixth, an ACP for CIC should allow for imposition of a variety of sanctions with 
the necessary degree of flexibility. There could be the possibility of sentence reduction, 
alternatives to imprisonment and a combination of sentences and/or sanctions. Flexibility 
might also include barring certain people from serving in police and security forces for a 
defined period of time or limiting their participation in the political life of the given 
country. 
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  Rule of Law Tools for Post-conflict States: Maximizing the Legacy of Hybrid Courts. Convened by Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. New York and Geneva, 2008, p. 18. 
See http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HybridCourts.pdf [Visited 20 August 2009]. 
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4. Arguments for and against of ACP for CIC 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the appropriateness of ACP for CIC. To do so, I 
will commence with arguments in favour (section 4.1.) and continue with arguments 
against (section 4.2.).75 The final aim of this chapter is to offer some guiding principles that 
I believe should be considered if an ACP for CIC, as described in section 3.6., is to meet 
the interest of stakeholders in the CIC process (section 4.3.). 
 
4.1. Arguments in favour 
4.1.1. ACP for CIC, within existing CJS, is the most fair and realistic way to address 
the obligation to prosecute and prevent impunity 
In light of the fact that large scale conflicts result in tremendous damage and destruction to 
people and property, it is advisable to keep in mind the scale, gravity and complexity of the 
atrocities and the identity of victims and perpetrators. Countries have individual statutory 
obligations to investigate and prosecute all crimes. International instruments such as the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1948 Genocide Convention and the 1998 ICC Statute 
impose on the Contracting Parties a duty to investigate, prosecute and punish individuals 
responsible for CIC.76 The principle of universal jurisdiction provides the reinforcing effect 
to the obligation to prosecute.77 The inability of a CJS to resolve a backlog of CIC cases 
may cause a failure to fulfil this obligation. Pressure to adequately address the issue may 
create temptations to use mechanisms outside the existing CJS for dealing with the 
reported crimes78 or to grant amnesties. An ACP for CIC, because it is fair and efficient, 
can address this serious problem and alleviate concerns that use of such alternative 
mechanisms might result in factual impunity. 
It is very important that these matters be resolved within the CJS. When cases 
remain in the CJS it helps show that government is willing and capable to deal with past 
atrocities. Of course, CIC are not the only type of crime amenable to create extraordinary 
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situations within the CJS. In many countries there is often an accumulation of non-CIC 
cases that overload the CJS and create delays in it. In such situations, legal systems attempt 
to find alternative solutions to deal with backlogs, such as decriminalization.79 Due to the 
nature and gravity of CIC, they cannot be decriminalized like some ordinary offences that 
are removed from the CJS. An ACP for CIC within the CJS can be an effective way to 
address the matter of backlogs and prevent the perception and reality of impunity. 
  
4.1.2. ACP for CIC will be trusted by victims and the general public  
In order to trust their government, victims and the general public must perceive 
accountability as serious and genuine. This may be accomplished by an official body with 
power to deliver justice and the willingness to deal with, and distance itself from, the past 
atrocities.80 There is a high expectation that the government demonstrates it possesses the 
necessary degree of competence, independence and impartiality. Furthermore, it is 
important for the victims to have their suffering acknowledged in an independent judicial 
process. It is equally important that they have an ability to fully enforce their rights and 
obtain redress. 
An ACP for CIC structured along the lines indicated in section 3.6. will go far in 
establishing victims’ trust. As mentioned above, when cases remain in the CJS, it prevents 
sending the wrong signal to victims and the general public that the government is unwilling 
or incapable to deal with past atrocities. It may calm their fears that reform processes are 
ineffective or operating too slow, or that the government is failing to deliver genuine 
accountability for the crimes occasioned upon them. A properly designed ACP for CIC 
possesses a sufficient degree of quality of judicial determination that would be hard for 
anyone to deny in the future. 
 
4.1.3. ACP for CIC allows equitable sharing of limited resources and increases the 
overall capacity of the CJS 
The prolonged existence of a large backlog of CIC cases can have negative effect on the 
ability of the CJS to deal with other forms of crime, reform of the justice system and 
capacity building. Other such crimes that societies must cope with include, but are not 
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  Jehle, Jorg-Martin and Wade, Marianne. Coping with Overloaded Criminal Justice Systems: The Rise of 
Prosecutorial Power Across Europe. Berlin, (Springer) 2006, p. 5. 
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limited to, hate crimes, organized crime and corruption. In many transitional countries, the 
whole justice sector is being reformed. Success of reform is normally evaluated by the 
progress made on the most sensitive and controversial cases. As a rule, limited or scarce 
available resources will create an exigency to choose priorities. This translates into a need 
for reasonable allocation of resources in order to resolve different challenges that justice 
sector might face.  
CIC require a specialized capacity. As seen below, the monetary cost of a full 
blown CIC trial is enormous. Additionally, extensive investment will have to be made in 
human and other resources. It will be essential to train legal professionals to meet all the 
standards of these lengthy and complicated CIC criminal procedures. In addition, these 
cases often attract the most competent minds. This may result in two layers of 
professionals within the CJS, one that works on CIC, another that deals with the rest of the 
justice matters. Such a two-tiered system hinders the ability of the CJS to deliver justice 
across the system. It cannot reasonably be argued that all resources should be allocated to 
CIC, nor can CIC receive unlimited logistical support. An ACP for CIC, because it is 
efficient and streamlined to process cases more quickly, will allow for a more equitable 
sharing of time, human and other capital that will increase the overall capacity of the CJS. 
 
4.1.4. ACP for CIC would be faster and more cost-effective than full criminal trials 
When one considers the costs, length and output of full, non-abbreviated CIC trials, there 
is an inconsistency. A few statistics evidence this fact. At the ICTY, in 2005, it was 
estimated that the average trial at first instance took about one year. Some lasted as long as 
three years. In nine years, the ICTY completed thirty-five trials, involving forty-six 
individuals. Out of this number, seventeen persons in fifteen cases pleaded guilty.81 In 
2009, the staff of the Tribunal numbered 1,118. Its budget grew from $276,000 USD in 
1993, to $342,332,300 USD for the 2008-2009 biennial.82  
At the national level, the statistics for Bosnia and Herzegovina on the number of 
started and completed CIC cases, between January 2004 and April 2009, processed at the 
four levels of government83, show that 133 cases were started84 and 91 completed85. Data 
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has shown that all prosecutors’ offices in Bosnia and Herzegovina reported 12,484 persons 
as possible perpetrators of war crimes in the period between 1992 and 2006’86. Between 
2006 and 2009, the State Court completed an average of seven cases per year.87 Even with 
a dramatic increase in procedural efficiency, it is very doubtful this apparent backlog can 
be cleared by use of existing criminal procedures, particularly while suspects and witnesses 
are still alive. 
From the above, it follows that, at the international level, the small overall output is 
perhaps due to cumbersome and over-complex procedures. On the national level, it appears 
that the problem with output may be due to lack of capacity. In either event, the concept of 
ACP for CIC presented in this thesis may reduce the overall time required to prosecute 
many CIC cases and the backlog that results from conducting full trials. 
In an ACP, the accused may waive his/her right to a main trial and there is an 
increased possibility that there will be no appellate proceedings. If so, from a practical 
standpoint, drafting a judgment may likely be the most time consuming part of the ACP. 
Logistical problems that often exist, such as the lack of courtrooms or specialized 
premises, would be considerably alleviated. The need may still arise for witness protection 
measures, but if written testimony is used, there would be a decreased, if any, need for 
witness hearings during the trial. Moreover, when judges do not speak the same language 
as a witness, ACP would save time over simultaneous translations as well as translations of 
transcripts. 
ACP for CIC will allow for advancements at the sentencing stage, too. The 
relatively few sentences meted out by the ICTY and ICTR are served abroad on the basis 
of special agreements with the host countries, but the situation is different when it comes to 
national jurisdictions where countries might still be badly affected by economic problems. 
The prison sentences in such CIC cases might overstretch the prison capacities.88 
Imprisonment costs will be shifted to the society. Arguably, there might not be enough 
money for the victims’ claims. Studies have shown that alternative mechanisms of 
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punishment can be much less costly than imprisonment.89 Thus, use of an ACP for CIC, if 
it reduces rates and costs of incarceration, may provide long-term benefits for victims. 
 
4.1.5. ACP for CIC may overcome public scepticism  
Once a state chooses to implement its obligation to prosecute individuals for alleged CIC, 
it would represent a defeat if the CJS cannot manage to process such cases. It would also 
create scepticism regarding its general ability to process all cases. This scepticism can 
come from the general public, victims, or donors interested in building capacity in 
transitional countries. The slow pace of resolving backlogs of cases and the overall low 
number of judgments rendered can also build scepticism, not to mention speculation 
regarding the independence of the justice sector from political influences, or its outright 
willingness to address the issue in a serious manner. The general competence to deal with 
this complex field of law and the ability to organize the work efficiently and effectively 
may also come into question. In addition, lawyers may feel they lack competence to handle 
issues with larger social and political implications, and thus be adversely affected. 
If CJS introduces mechanisms, such as a well functioning ACP for CIC, this will 
likely increase the output of its work and begin to tangibly resolve the backlog of CIC 
cases. The above-mentioned problems and attitude of sceptics can be managed. Overall 
progress and ability to demonstrate visible and realistic ways of resolving the issue 
motivates the support of the public, political and donor communities, both to the CJS in 
general and prosecution in particular. 
 
4.1.6. ACP for CIC may decrease the chances for impunity 
If CIC case files cannot be dealt with inside the CJS, due to lack of capacity, but are given 
to other mechanisms, such as TRC or general amnesties, the chances for impunity will 
arise. There likely will be a temptation when dealing with large backlogs of CIC cases to 
argue that alternative mechanisms will better resolve the issues and lessen pressure on the 
CJS. However, processing CIC cases outside the CJS would be problematic in relation to 
the principle of individual criminal responsibility. Furthermore, there are strong arguments 
from the victims concerning their right to justice and legal redress for victimisation and 
suffering. 
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Alternative mechanisms may prove disadvantageous in other ways. Even if 
political considerations result in their use, backlogs may still remain. Such mechanisms 
may face similar problems to those of the judiciary. These include the lack of capacity, 
resources, and inability to address large number of issues during their limited existence. 
Their methodologies do not involve processing of individual cases or pronouncements of 
individual criminal responsibility. Since they won’t be able to process the judicial backlog 
and may even generate their own, they foreseeably may apply amnesties to close backlogs, 
and impunity will result. With regard to amnesties, one commentator has noted that ‘there 
is growing support for the position that amnesties for the core crimes [...] are generally 
incompatible with international law.'90 In short, alternative mechanisms may not avoid 
impunity. Because of the capacity of ACP for CIC to deal with backlogs in a fair manner, 
the potential for impunity will be decreased. 
 
4.1.7. ACP for CIC will contribute to truth-telling and creation of a judicial and 
historical record 
It is generally recognized that judicial decisions create an accurate and undeniable 
historical record of the factual basis of crimes that were committed during the conflict.91 It 
establishes, according to the highest judicial standards, the role and involvement of the 
individuals and organizations in the events. In comparison with any other form of written 
or oral decisions, a judgment gives the highest degree of attention to important details of 
atrocities and how they occurred. 
One decision that clearly established an undeniable factual basis is the ICTY 
judgment delivered in Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., regarding the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the establishment of Omarska, Keraterm and Trnopolje concentration camps.92 
Even the genocide in Srebrenica was denied by a certain part of the population at the 
perpetrators’ side. Such denial is absurd after the ICTY judgment in Krstić case or the ICJ 
judgment in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia.93 
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An ACP for CIC preserves the unique and crucially important role of judicial 
determination and provides a written record of the past, with the highest standard of proof, 
for generations to come. This is perhaps the main difference between the ACP and other 
alternative mechanisms. 
 
4.2. Arguments against 
4.2.1. ACP for CIC might not meet important fair trial standards  
No one should be punished for CIC without a fair hearing, as a matter of due process.94 
This is a fundamental consideration of human rights and criminal procedure. Although the 
interrelated right to be tried without undue delay95 is significant, particularly to the 
incarcerated, a rush to an abbreviated trial has several important shortcomings. It follows 
that fairness should not be compromised on account of expediency. For example, if an 
ACP uses previous statements or testimony of a witness, where defendant or counsel was 
unable to cross-examine, then defendant’s right to examine witnesses is denied.96 Also, in 
the haste to process cases, where often the prosecutor has had months or years to 
accumulate evidence, there is a question concerning defendant’s right to have adequate 
time and facilities to prepare a defence.97 Defence counsel in ordinary criminal 
proceedings complain that ‘equality of arms’ slants towards the prosecution.98 In an 
abbreviated procedure, the above-mentioned shortcomings will most likely be even more 
pronounced. Unless these rights can be sufficiently safeguarded, the defendant must 
receive full trial. 
  
4.2.2. ACP for CIC are not suitable because the crimes are too serious  
No crimes are as serious as CIC from an individual and societal point of view. One need 
only look at a few of these crimes or the acts that constitute them. Genocide. 
Extermination. Torture. Enslavement. Biological experiments.99 These are acts of 
depravity. It might therefore be very difficult and even unpopular to argue for application 
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of ACP to crimes placed in the CIC category. Many in society, not to mention victims, will 
oppose the concept of ACP for CIC on this basis alone. This is so, even if, as stated in 
section 3.6. above, certain lines can be drawn to establish sub-categories according to 
specific criteria. Overall, it is a matter of morality and ethics, and, for this reason, such 
argument may have merit. 
4.2.3. ACP for CIC might create a discriminatory sentencing regime causing adverse 
consequences 
One of the requirements for a potential ACP for CIC is an introduction of a special 
sentencing regimen as incentive for defendants to participate and to make the process 
practicable. However, imposition of reduced or alternative sentences for CIC may be seen 
as inappropriate and unjust. In this regard, such punishment, considering the seriousness 
and consequences of CIC, could create a perception of insufficiency and cause a strong 
negative reaction in the public. Opposition from the victims’ community might be the most 
powerful. Politicians, as creatures of public opinion, may feel reluctance to undertake steps 
needed for legalization of alternative forms of punishment or ACP for CIC in general.  
Additionally, introduction of a specialized sentencing regime for CIC cases will in 
most situations create a vacuum between the sentencing regime for ordinary crimes and 
CIC. In other words, the murderer in time of peace might get a much harsher sentence than 
a war time murderer. If CIC are handled so differently, a paradoxical situation will occur 
that undermines the logic of the whole CJS. It would be extremely difficult to explain to 
the victims why certain interests are being protected and valued more in peace time than in 
war. 
 
4.2.4. ACP for CIC might not meet expectations of victims 
When it comes to processing of and accountability for CIC, victims’ expectations could, 
arguably, be placed in two categories, one involving process, the other involving 
punishment. Research conducted in post conflict or conflict regions reflects the preferences 
of victims:  
‘The statistics on what victims view as the main purposes of taking action 
against offenders are fascinating. Sixty-nine percent said that establishing the 
truth about what happened is a main purpose – in fact, this is the most 
frequently identified purpose. A further 25 percent answered that enabling 
people to live together was a main purpose; the same percentage indicated 
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that taking revenge on the perpetrators was a main purpose (again 
researchers permitted multiple responses by victim interviewees).’100 
  
The same study also said, ‘Overall, in terms of sanction, 42 percent of victims supported 
imprisonment and 39 percent payment of money to the victims.’101 
 Besides the views supporting the victims’ right to truth, trial, justice and 
punishment, there are others who maintain that, for example, a judicial pronouncement of 
guilt with all its implications is sufficient for the reinstatement of the victim, regardless of 
the enforcement of punishment. Some other views profess that one cannot talk about 
victims before the occurrence of a trial wherein their victimhood is established. Until then, 
one can only speak about the ‘alleged’ victims and the ‘alleged’ perpetrators.102 
 Moreover, because ACP for CIC does not provide a full trial, some victims may 
feel they are treated like they have suffered less. They might think that justice is biased and 
that certain crimes are accorded preferential treatment through prioritisation. Indeed, the 
family of a murdered person cares little about how their loved one was killed or about the 
legal classification of the act; in either event a member of the family is forever gone. 
However, legal classification could cause some of these crimes to be prioritised for full 
trial while others may be directed into an abbreviated procedure. Victims may feel 
neglected if perpetrated crimes qualify for an ACP. The potential for differentiation in the 
treatment and punishment of perpetrators for their crimes makes ACP for CIC both 
difficult to administer and insufficient to satisfy the needs and expectations of victims. 
 
4.2.5. ACP for CIC might lack consensus or face significant resistance 
It may be an extraordinary task for the main actors of the CJS to agree on the application of 
an ACP for CIC. A large number of lawyers may be keen to preserve the traditional legal 
thinking that the main effect of criminal law is deterrence and retribution. These lawyers 
will most likely be oriented towards making perpetrators face full trials and receive 
maximum sentences. Much effort and debate may be necessary to persuade lawyers to 
acknowledge that the legal system they belong to and trust is not always able to cope with 
the challenges before it in a fair, efficient and productive manner. 
                                                 
100
  See supra note 49, p. 43. 
101
  Id., p. 42. 
102
  See more on all the above views in the article by Sanchez, Jesus-Maria Silva. Doctrines Regarding „The 
Fight Against Impunity“ and „The Victim's Right for the Perpetrator to be Punished“. In: Pace Law 
Review (2008), Pace University School of Law. 
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In post conflict countries, the debate on ACP for CIC might easily become a 
political discussion where it will not be easy to secure necessary support. Many political 
actors may fear that such an approach will be perceived as a lenient criminal policy 
towards perpetrators. Their main concern is how to formally end the process of transition 
while serving the interests of victims, the general public and the rule of law, and the 
conflicts that often arise between them. Since an ACP for CIC may prove controversial 
from the point of view of these different groups and interests, politicians may choose not to 
take a clear position in the matter. However, their need not to be seen as ‘soft’ towards 
those whose behaviour is condemned by the public creates a paralysing effect that causes 
inaction rather than action that may undermine necessary political support. Despite their 
motivations, delay exacerbates the problem of dealing with CIC overall, not to mention 
completing the transition process.  
More than constituting an argument against ACP for CIC, this phenomenon is an 
explanation as to why ACP for CIC may not occur. Without leadership from the relevant 
actors, public support cannot be generated and reform will most likely never get off the 
ground. 
 
4.2.6. ACP for CIC will require amendments to both substantive and procedural law 
Substantial changes of law and the introduction of new institutes is a challenging exercise 
that requires effort and consensus at the legislative, executive and judicial level. 
Introduction of an ACP for CIC will require significant changes in very sensitive areas of 
criminal procedure and sentencing policy. If special court panels and prosecutorial units 
are to be designated solely for the application of ACP, then laws on courts and prosecutors’ 
offices might also require amendments. Very few jurisdictions presently allow for some 
sort of accelerated procedure even for ordinary crimes. Although not largely perceived as 
controversial, the majority of the civil law countries do not even see a need for introduction 
of a plea negotiations procedure. It would not be surprising, therefore, to see these same 
countries oppose an ACP for CIC with its innovative features. 
 However, even if the legal community accepts the possibility as such, introduction 
of an ACP for CIC might encounter further obstacles at the political level. Some prominent 
members of political parties in countries in transition, associated with various groups in the 
former conflict, may pursue a negative agenda when it comes to formulating and 
implementing an ACP for CIC. In other words, they might apply pressure to create a 
watered-down procedure in which it is difficult to obtain full accountability for criminal 
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behaviour, in order to protect their favoured group. There is also a more negative 
possibility that these same individuals find themselves sitting in a parliament. Such is the 
case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the once conflicting ethnic groups are all 
represented in parliament. Members of each group are able to block laws they believe 
adversely affect their vital national interest. In such a situation, there or elsewhere, it would 
not be surprising that at least one such group might obstruct any proposed legislation that 
could eventually lead to its members being held accountable for CIC. 
Once more, this is not a substantive legal argument against an ACP for CIC, but it 
rather constitutes a political obstacle that cannot be ignored with respect to prospects for its 
implementation. 
 
4.2.7. ACP for CIC is uncertain to actually work in practice 
ACP for CIC are untested and unproven. The absence of precedent makes it more difficult 
to know if they will work in practice. Under the best of circumstances, it will be a 
challenge to make them function. Legal professionals will have to be trained in order to 
deliver positive results. This may not be an easy task.  First, it is a foreign concept to the 
majority of CJS and may therefore breed scepticism among practitioners, and an 
unwillingness to use it. Second, to implement change in an institutional system that was 
functioning in the same constant mode for many years may take too much time. Assuming 
the resistance to change outweighs other variables, an ACP for CIC may not ever get off 
the ground. 
 
4.2.8. ACP for CIC might not be capable to resolve the backlog  
The possibility exists that, even with an ACP for CIC, some situations will entail a scale of 
victimisation so large, like in Rwanda, that the number of perpetrators overwhelms the 
ability of CJS to address this issue in its totality. Even with the procedure in place and all 
the will needed, the lack of adequate participation by perpetrators, described below, or the 
simple weight of too many cases will prove that the mechanism is ineffective or has little 
effect on actually solving the backlog. In such a situation, no system within the CJS will 
work. As previously discussed, it would not serve the public interest to create a system that 
will not remedy the problem. 
 
4.2.9. ACP for CIC might be rejected by perpetrators  
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The political and ideological context may cause perpetrators to reject ACP for CIC. In 
some cases, suspects for CIC might find themselves going to trials as heroes in the eyes of 
their governments, political factions, religious or ethnic groups. The possibility that these 
suspects will actively participate in the ACP can be perceived as treason. They may not 
regret the crimes they have committed. If they admit the facts, they are betraying their 
cause. They may also fear that they or their family will be persecuted on account of their 
admission, especially in places where there is still strong political support for the ideology 
or political system that stood behind or benefited from perpetration of these crimes. Mark 
Drumbl catches the spirit of this mentality quite well in the Rwandan context, through 
interviews conducted with genocide suspects in the central prison of Kigali: 
Nearly every interviewee did not believe he or she had done anything 
“wrong”, or that anything really “wrong” had happened, in the summer of 
1994. Detainees who acknowledged that violence had occurred generally 
believed it was necessary out of self-defence. These detainees did not 
perceive the massacres as genocidal or in any way manifestly illegal. They 
saw themselves as honourable citizens tasked to do the dirty work of 
furthering the interests of the state. Even after years in jail, these detainees 
had not been disabused of the propaganda fed to them by extremist Hutu 
leaders, according to which the Tutsi were out to attack them, so, therefore 
this attack had to be pre-empted by killing all the Tutsi. This violence 
therefore became legitimized as a preemptive war of survival, not 
condemned as genocide. Unsurprisingly, then, many detainees saw 
themselves as prisoners of war, simply ending up on the losing side.103 
 
It is ironic, however, that these suspects, with their skewed visions of reality, by rejecting 
the potential benefits of an ACP for CIC, may thereby subject themselves to a less 
forgiving outcome of a regular criminal procedure. 
 
4.3. Conclusion: observations on the arguments and positions; guiding principles  
As seen above, reasonably compelling arguments can be made on both sides of the issue 
concerning ACP for CIC, depending on one’s perspective. In attempting to synthesise the 
positions surrounding this matter, I believe a system that addresses the basic features 
described in section 3.6. would create an effective, efficient and fair mechanism. In 
addition, I believe the following guiding principles for an ACP for CIC might be helpful to 
address and serve the interests of the stakeholders, and increase the prospects for its 
success. 
                                                 
103
  Supra note 49, p. 97. 
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 First, the system must be flexible. This will allow the judge, sometimes in 
consultation with the parties, to fashion the process in a way that best serves the dictates of 
justice. In other words, one size does not fit all. Flexibility will protect fundamental human 
rights standards for fair proceedings in a process tailored to meet the requirements of each 
particular case. For example, in a relatively simple, straightforward matter, the parties may 
agree that all evidence is submitted in writing. In a more complex case, the judge may 
decide or a party may request that written evidence be supplemented by oral testimony. 
The overarching aim is to make the CJS work. 
Second, the system should effectively process large backlogs of cases without 
violating precepts of due process. It must indeed provide more cost-effective and faster 
justice than the normal procedure while also allowing for the interests of victims to be 
respected and the historical record to be preserved by detailed, reasoned judicial decisions. 
Third, it must be administered within the CJS, that is, the case files must remain 
within the prosecution service and the judiciary until they are closed, while not dismissing 
alternative mechanisms in the most extreme cases. 
Fourth, it may be necessary to distinguish between the most serious and less serious 
CIC, and the levels of participation in their commission, without a discriminatory effect. 
Fifth, there must be a real risk of normal criminal justice accountability for a 
suspect to be willing to make use of an ACP for CIC while at the same time providing an 
incentive to choose the process, perhaps by offering reduced punishments. 
Sixth, it must generate sufficient support in the political, legal and other 
communities of interest in society. To do so, an ACP for CIC must be clearly and precisely 
defined, predictable and practical, attending to requirements of legitimacy, efficiency and 
fairness. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
 
The ultimate purpose of a CJS is to promote the rule of law and thereby further the interest 
of society. Without the rule of law, citizens can lose faith in their government and political 
institutions, even in each other. When this happens, the climate ripens for conflict and 
strife that may in the most extreme circumstances result in the commission of CIC.  This is 
the sad legacy of history. When CIC occur, calls for accountability arise in the aftermath. It 
is therefore important to create mechanisms that are consistent with the maintenance of the 
principle of individual criminal responsibility, especially when criminal conduct shocks the 
conscience. Out of the international resolve to prosecute individuals responsible for these 
crimes, international tribunals emerged, from Nuremberg to the more recent ad hoc 
tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, to the ICC. 
As seen in this thesis, these recent ad hoc tribunals did not cope with the large 
number of CIC cases within their jurisdiction, and over time prioritised prosecutions to 
those involving the highest level suspects, the senior leaders suspected of being most 
responsible for crimes. Over time, a general shift of the duty to prosecute CIC cases 
occurred from international tribunals to the countries where crimes were committed. Many 
of these states, however, are in the process of transition from conflict and lack adequate 
capacity to address the issue of CIC through criminal prosecutions. They, therefore, must 
make important and difficult decisions as to whether they will deal with these heinous 
crimes within their CJS or outside of it.  
States ideally will choose a path where CIC are processed inside the CJS, but 
depending upon the circumstances this may not be possible. Individual conflicts and the 
ramifications that result are never the same in their nature and scale. Each country in 
conflict has its unique history, circumstances and internal pressures. Different interest 
groups, such as victims, perpetrators, lawyers, politicians and others have different agendas 
and expectations. There is an ongoing competition for capacity and resources available to 
address societal demands. CIC are but one. Resultantly, some states may choose alternative 
mechanisms, such as TRC, to move their process of transition and rehabilitation of society 
forward towards completion. These alternative methods are not without shortcomings. This 
thesis does not deliver judgment about which path is the right one for an individual state to 
choose for itself. It rather acknowledges the many factors involved in these determinations. 
In states that choose to fulfil the international obligation to prosecute CIC and 
address them within their CJS, the need to develop the capacity of the CJS is paramount. 
 43 
Most likely, an extreme number of cases will create backlogs.  The CJS will therefore have 
to be nurtured and strengthened to combat backlogs. One means to accomplish this 
purpose, described in the thesis, may be through adoption of an ACP for CIC which are 
procedures that entail a significantly shortened approach to the processing of CIC cases, as 
opposed to the regular criminal procedure of a full trial. Their primary aim is to increase 
the ability of the CJS to resolve large number of cases that create backlogs, while 
respecting basic fair trial principles. This latter feature cannot be compromised. In order to 
achieve the desired aim, these procedures should be prescribed by law and administered by 
regular courts in a flexible manner, without creating additional institutional layers that can 
further impede the system. To build public confidence, the process must be transparent and 
open, serving not only to mete out justice and address the needs of victims, but to educate 
and assist societies in transition to become whole. The ACP for CIC mechanism must 
provide for a variety of sanctions with a necessary degree of flexibility. The component of 
general flexibility is essential throughout the system to deal with peculiarities that will 
invariably arise in the facts, circumstances, contexts and evidentiary needs of case files.  
An ACP for CIC must function under the principle that not one size fits all. 
 There will be arguments in favour and against an ACP for CIC, some strictly legal 
while others overlap into the political. None should be overlooked or dismissed outright. 
This thesis examined certain arguments and culled from them guiding principles that may 
be indispensable in the development of an ACP for CIC. The guiding principles assume 
that the features for an ACP for CIC, set forth in Section 3.6., would apply. Perhaps, the 
overarching principle is that the procedure must be flexible and tailored to meet the 
requirements of each particular case for the purpose of resolving backlogs of cases 
expeditiously, yet not ignore the rights of defendants or the interests of victims or the 
society at large. It must garner support of the stakeholders within CJS and other interested 
parties, and be seen as a reliable tool of the CJS. In exceptional circumstances, alternative 
mechanisms such as TRC may be appropriate in conjunction therewith. An ACP for CIC 
must be responsive to different classifications of CIC cases, but not arbitrary. Finally, the 
procedure must incentivise its use by defendants while maintaining a tangible risk of 
normal criminal justice accountability.  
 Design and implementation of ACP for CIC will not be an easy task. Each country 
that creates an ACP for CIC will have to mould it according to its needs. The Colombian 
Peace and Justice process is a good example where a state did so. This thesis did not seek 
to provide concrete answers and solutions for a system that does not yet exist, but set forth 
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to raise issues for consideration when and if that time comes. It would be gratifying to have 
a world without CIC, but that is not the reality. When these crimes occur, generally on a 
large scale, they should not go unaddressed simply because a CJS cannot deal with their 
number. CIC cases cannot be ignored, even if they must be dealt with outside the CJS. 
Otherwise, impunity and a potential break down of society may loom. If we desire to live 
in a civilised world, giving respect to principles of international law, the laws of humanity 
and the requirements of the public conscience, this is a true test of our character.104 
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 A 
Annex A 
 
Italian Code of Criminal Procedure 
Chapter VI: special proceedings 
Title I: abbreviated judgment (giudizio abbreviato) 
 
Art. 438. Preconditions for abbreviated judgement 
1. The accused may request that the verdict is reached at the stage of the preliminary 
hearing on the basis of the available documents, except in the case foreseen under 
para 5 of this article and art. 441 para 5. 
2. The request can be submitted, orally or in written, until the conclusions pursuant to 
art. 421 and 422 have been formulated105. 
3. The intention of the accused (to submit the request, n.o.a.) is expressed personally 
or through his legal representative. 
4. Upon the request, the judge issues the order disposing the abbreviated judgment 
5. Without prejudice for the use as evidence of the documents mentioned in art. 442 
para 1 bis, the accused may make his request conditional on the acquisition of 
additional evidence which is necessary to reach the verdict. The judge will order 
the abbreviated judgment if the acquisition of additional evidence is assessed to be 
necessary to reach the verdict and is compatible with the goal of procedural 
economy in  abbreviated judgement, taking into account the materials already 
acquired and admissible. In this case, the prosecutor may ask for the admission of 
evidence in rebuttal. Art. 423 remains applicable106. 
6. In case that, under para. 5, the request is rejected, the request can be submitted 
again until the term set in para 2. 
 
Art. 439 and 440 – deleted 
 
Art. 441. Direction of the abbreviated judgment 
1. In the abbreviated judgment, the provisions applicable during the preliminary 
hearing will be applicable to the extent possible and with the exception of those 
foreseen under art. 422 and 423107. 
2. The intervention of the civil party after he became aware of the order disposing the 
abbreviated judgment, is equal to his acceptance of the abbreviated proceedings.  
3. Abbreviated judgment takes place in camera; the judge will order that the trial is 
carried out in public hearing when all accused make request for that.  
4. If the civil party does not accept the abbreviated proceedings, art. 75 para 3 does 
not apply108. 
                                                 
105
 These are the conclusions formulated at the preliminary hearing by which the prosecutor and the defence 
argue on the confirmation of the indictment on the basis of the material contained in the case-file. 
106
 Article 423 foresees the possibility for the prosecutor to amend the indictment at the preliminary hearing, 
if during this hearing the facts turn out to be different from those described in the indictment, or a 
connected crime or aggravated circumstance emerges during the hearing .  
107
 Art. 422 foresees the possibility during the preliminary hearing to acquire additional evidence.  
 B
5. In case that the Judge evaluates that he would not be able to adjudicate the case on 
the basis of the available documents, he acquires, even ex officio, the elements 
which are necessary to adjudicate the case. In this case, art. 423 remains 
applicable. 
6. The acquisition of evidence pursuant to para. 5 of this article and para. 5 of art. 
438, will be carried out in accordance with the procedure foreseen in art. 422 para. 
2, 3 , 4 . 
 
Art. 441 bis. Decisions of the Judge following new accusations during the abbreviated 
judgment 
1. If, in the cases regulated under art. 438 para 5 and 441 para 5, the prosecutor 
submits new accusations pursuant to art. 423 para 1, the accused can ask that the 
proceedings continue in the ordinary forms (ie, main trial, n.o.a.) 
2. The intention of the accused is expressed in the forms prescribed under art. 438 
para 3  
3. The Judge, upon motion of the accused or the defence counsel, will give a term not 
exceeding 10 days, for the formulation of the request under para 1 and 2 or for the 
integration of the defence, and will suspend the judgment for that period. 
4. If the accused asks that the proceedings continue in the ordinary forms, the Judge 
revokes the order upon which the abbreviated judgment had been disposed and 
schedules the preliminary hearing or its continuation. The acts carried out pursuant 
to art. 438 para 5 and 441 para 5, have the same validity than the acts carried out 
pursuant to art. 422. The request for abbreviated judgment cannot be submitted 
again. Art. 303 para 2 will apply109. 
5. If the proceedings continue in the form of abbreviated judgement, the accused can 
ask for the admission of new evidence in relation to the new accusations pursuant 
to art. 423, even beyond the limits prescribed under art. 438 para 5 and the 
prosecutor may ask the admission of evidence in rebuttal. 
 
Art. 442. Decision 
1. At the end of the evidentiary procedure, the judge adjudicates on the case 
pursuant to art. 529 and following110. 
1 bis. In order to issue the verdict, the judge will base himself on the documents 
included in the case-file pursuant to art. 416 para 2, the documentation pursuant to 
art. 419 para 3111 and the evidence admitted during the hearing. 
2. In case of guilty verdict, the sentence which the judge determines taking into 
account all circumstances is diminished by 1/3. Life imprisonment is commuted 
with 30 years of imprisonment. Life imprisonment with daily isolation, in the 
cases of concurrent crimes and continued crime is commuted to life 
imprisonment.  
                                                                                                                                                    
108
  This para. prescribes that the civil action for compensation is suspended during the course of the criminal 
proceedings in case of intervention of the civil party in the criminal proceedings.  
109
  Art. 303 is about the terms for pre-trial custody. 
110
  Art. 529 and following prescribe the type of verdicts and their elements. Basically, the abbreviated 
judgment ends up with the same kind of sentences that can be taken at the end of a main trial.   
111
  This is the prosecutor case-file containing the material supporting the indictment.  
 C
3. The verdict is notified to the accused who did not appear. 
4. Art. 426 para. 2 applies (this art. lists  the elements of the verdicts, n.o.a.). 
 
Art. 443. Limits of the appeal 
1. The accused and the prosecutor cannot appeal against a non-guilty verdict. 
2. deleted 
3. The prosecutor cannot submit an appeal against guilty verdict, unless the verdict 
requalifies the offence. 
4. The appeal judgement is carried out in the forms prescribed under art. 599 (this art. 
lists the kind of appeals that are decided in camera, n.o.a.). 
 
 
 
